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Abstract: In economic management, we often use some (divisible) private resources to cooperative. Fuzzy
coalitions always be used to describe this situation in cooperative fuzzy games. In this paper, we proposed two
new solution concepts in NTU cooperative fuzzy games, and discussed their properties.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
In economic management, businessmen often possess some (divisible) private resources such as

commodities, time, money, and have to decide about the amount to be invested in the joint project. Cooperative
games with fuzzy coalitions are introduced in [1] and [2] to model the above situations where businessmen have
the possibility to cooperate with different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation,
and where the obtained reward depends on the levels of participation.
In this paper, we proposed more reasonable concepts of the bargaining sets which are very important
solution concepts in game theory underlying NTU cooperative fuzzy game, and prove the inclusion relation
between them. It is necessary to claim that the results of this paper were based on the work of Tijs[3] Muto[4] and
Zhang Fengrong[5] .

2.

PRELIMINARIES
Let N={1,2,…,n} be a finite player set, and a fuzzy coalition is a vector s∈[0,1]N. The i-th coordinate si of s

is the participation level of player i in the fuzzy coalition s. Instead of [0,1]N we will also write ΦN for the set of
fuzzy coalitions on player set N.
For s ∈ΦN we define the carrier of s by car(s)={i∈N| si >0} and call s a proper fuzzy coalition if car(s)≠N.
The set of proper fuzzy coalitions on player set N is denoted by ΠΦN, and the set of non-empty proper fuzzy
coalitions on player set N by ΠΦ0N. For s, t ∈ΦN we use the notation s≤t expresses si ≤ ti for each i∈ N. We
define s∧t=(min(s1, t1),…, min(sn, tn)) and s∨t=(max(s1, t1),…, max(sn, tn)).
Let Rcar(s) indicates |car(s)|-dimension Euclid space. Denoted x≤y means xi≤yi for each i ∈ car(s); and x<<y
means xi < yi for each i∈car(s) for any x, y∈Rcar(s).
An NTU fuzzy cooperative game is a pair (N, V), where N={1,2,…,n} is a non-empty finite set, and V, the
characteristic function, assigns to every fuzzy coalition s a V(s) which is a subset of Rcar(s), and satisfies the
follow properties:
(1) V(0)=∅, where 0=(0,0,…,0).
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(2) For each s ∈ΦN, V(s) is a non-empty subset of Rcar(s), and it is closed and comprehensiveness. (that is to
say, if x∈V(s), y∈Rcar(s), and y ≤ x, then y∈V(s), too).
(3) For each x∈Rcar(s), V(s)∩(x+R+car(s)) is bounded.
(4) V(s) is nonlevelness, i.e., if x,y ∈ V0(s), and x≥y, then x=y, where, V0(s)={x ∈ V(s)|there is no y ∈ V(s), such
that x<<y} is boundary of V(s).
For any two disjoint fuzzy coalitions s and t, and two vectors x ∈ Rcar(s), y ∈ Rcar(t), we denote by (x, y) the
vector in Rcar(s) ∪ car(t) whose car(s)-components are as in x and car(t)-components are as in y. The game (N, V) is
superadditive if for every two fuzzy coalitions s and t with car(s)∩car(t)=∅, and any two vectors x∈V(s), y∈V(t),
we have (x, y)∈V(s∨t).
The preimputation set of NTU fuzzy game (N, V) is I0=V0(N), imputation set is I=V0(N)∩R+N
.
3.

BARGAINING SET FOR COOPERATIVE FUZZY GAME WITH NON-TRANSFERABLE
UTILITY
Wenbo Yang etc.[6] firstly extended the concept of bargaining set which was proposed by Davis-Machler[7]

to TU fuzzy game. Here we will redefine the concept of bargaining set from the view point of Davis-Machler to
NTU cooperative fuzzy game.
Definition 3.1 Let x be an imputation of the NTU fuzzy game (N, V), then an objection of player k against
player l with respect to x is a pair (y, s), if si yi > sixi, for all i∈car(s), y∈V(s), where s∈N with car(s)≠0 and N,

sk >0, sl=0, and y is a vector whose indices are the members of car(s).
Definition 3.2 Let x be an imputation of the NTU fuzzy game (N, V), and let (y, s) be an objection of
player k against player l with respect to x. Then (z, t) is a counter objection of player l to the objection (y, s) of
player k, if

t i ( z i − xi ) ≥ s i ( y i − xi ), for all i ∈ car ( s ) ∩ car (t )
t i z i ≥ t i xi , for all i ∈ car (t ) \ car ( s )
z ∈ V (t ) ,
where t ∈ΦN with tk=0, tl>0, and ti≥si, for all i ∈car(s)∩ car(t), and z is a vector whose indices are the members of

car(t).
Definition 3.3 An imputation x belongs to the bargaining set MF{i}(V) for a NTU fuzzy cooperative game, if
for every objection, there exists a counter objection to it.
Mos-Colell[8](1989) proposed another bargaining set, now we will redefine the concept to NTU fuzzy game
as follows.
Definition 3.4 Let x be a preimputation of the NTU fuzzy game (N, V), for a fuzzy coalition s ∈ ΦN, if
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car(s)≠0 and N, an objection on fuzzy coalition s with respect to x is a pair (y, s), where y∈Rcar(s) and satisfying:
y ∈ V ( s) ,
s i y i ≥ s i x i , i ∈ car ( s ) ,
and at least one of the inequalities above is strict.
Definition 3.5 Let x be a preimputation of the NTU fuzzy game (N, V), and let (y, s) be an objection to
fuzzy coalition s with respect to x. Then (z, t) is a counter objection on fuzzy coalition t ∈ΦN with respect to x,
here ti≥si, and for all i∈car(s)∩car(t), z∈Rcar(t) satisfying

z ∈ V (t )

t i ( z i − xi ) ≥ si ( y i − xi ), for all i ∈ car ( s) ∩ car (t )
t i z i ≥ t i xi , for all i ∈ car (t ) \ car ( s)
and at least one of the inequalities above is strict.
An objection is called justified, if there is no counter objection.
Definition 3.6 A preimputation x belongs to the bargaining set MBF(V) of NTU fuzzy cooperative game if
there is no justified objections with respect to x.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N, V) be a supperadditive NTU fuzzy game, then

M F{i} (V ) ⊆ MB F (V ) .
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that x∈MF{i}(V)\ MBF(V). Let (y, c) be a justified objection in the sense
of MBF(V) at x. Chosen c such that c≥s, where s is an any fuzzy coalition which can cause a justified objection
in MBF(V) at x. Let ck >0, and ckyk>ckxk. From the concept of the bargaining set MBF(V), we have car(s)≠N. Let

l∈N\car(c).
By the comprehensiveness and nonlevelness of V(c), we can modify y, and y is still in V(c). Let the

k-component of y will decrease, but is still great then xk, and the other components of y will increase. So, we
obtain a vector ~
y ∈ V (c) satisfying
c ~y > c x
k

k

k

k

c i ~y i > c i y i , i ∈ car (c) \ {k}
Clearly, ( ~
y , c) is an objection of k against l at x. Since x ∈ M F{i} (V ) , there exists a counter objection (z, d) to
(~
y , c) satisfying d i ≥ c i , i ∈ car (d ) Ι car (c) , d k = 0 , d l > 0 . So we have
d ( z − x ) ≥ c ( ~y − x ) > c ( y − x ), i ∈ car (d ) Ι car (c)
i

i

i

i

i

i

(1)

d i z i ≥ d i x i , i ∈ car (d ) \ car (c)

(2)

i

i

i

Thus, (z, d) satisfies almost all the requirements to be a counter objection to ( y, c) in the sense of MB F (V ) ,
except one condition, i.e., at least one strict inequality in (1) and (2) is true. Since ( y, c) is justified, and in the
inequality (1), car (c) Ι car (d ) must be an empty set. But from the property of surperadditivity, we know that
(( y, z ), c ∨ d )

is a justified objection in the sense of MB F (V )

assumption. The conclusion is true.

at x , so c < (c ∨ d ) , contradicting our
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CONCLUSIONS
NTU cooperative game can be converted to TU cooperative game under specific conditions. In the general

sense, NTU cooperative game can be viewed as the extension of TU cooperative game. But, many properties of
NTU cooperative game can help to study the properties of the TU cooperative games. In this paper we extended
two concepts of the bargaining set for TU cooperative game to NTU cooperative fuzzy game, and proved that
the inclusion relation between these two bargaining sets is still satisfied. The problem of the bargaining sets how
can be used in economic management effectively is still open[10]. We will work on it in future.
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